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I. Intro
The growing practice of returning individual results to research participants has revealed a 
variety of interpretations of the multiple and sometimes conflicting duties that researchers 
may owe to participants. One particularly difficult question is the nature and extent of a 
researcher’s duty to facilitate a participant’s follow-up clinical care by placing research 
results in the participant’s medical record. The question is especially difficult in the context 
of genomic research. Some recent genomic research studies — enrolling patients as 
participants — boldly address the question with protocols dictating that researchers place 
research results directly into study participants’ existing medical records, without participant 
consent. Such privileging of researcher judgment over participant choice may be motivated 
by a desire to discharge a duty that researchers perceive themselves as owing to participants. 
However, the underlying ethical, professional, legal, and regulatory duties that would 
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compel or justify this action have not been fully explored. This paper is not an argument for 
or against including genomic information in an individual’s medical record. Our purpose, 
rather, is to explore the specific question of who should decide whether to place genomic 
information generated in a research setting in a participant’s medical record.
The medical record is often referred to as a singular entity, in effect giving the narratives, 
test results, measurements, and other documents that comprise it an elevated status and a life 
and agency of their own. However, there is no single medical record that travels with a 
person throughout his or her life and to all the various hospitals and facilities where he or 
she may receive care.1 Instead, a medical record created in a particular setting — a clinic or 
hospital or other institution — will often be considered that provider’s complete 
documentation regarding a patient under its care. It may include records from other 
institutions if the patient authorizes the transmittal. While there is increasing movement to 
create electronic medical records (EMRs) that are transferable between different facilities 
and systems, there is not yet any guarantee that patients’ information will travel with them 
throughout their lives and on their various healthcare journeys. An overestimation of the 
uniformity, portability, and persistence of medical records may lead some researchers to also 
overestimate the legal and ethical duties surrounding the placement of information in those 
records.
In the body of this paper we explore what, if any, duties may justify a researcher’s 
independent disclosure of the findings outside the research setting. Section II introduces the 
tensions between clinical and research ethics, especially in the context of the poorly 
described but currently ascendant field of research that “translates” genomic findings into 
clinical care and promotes the integration of results into medical records. Section III reviews 
past discourse regarding whether to return genomic research results and which results to 
return, as well as the still-evolving discussion regarding how to return results. Section IV 
presents ethical, professional, legal, and regulatory arguments for and against placement of 
results in medical records and brings these arguments to bear on researchers’ perceptions of 
their duties to participants. We conclude that there is no clear ethical or legal duty for a 
researcher to place genomic research results in a medical record unless a participant requests 
its placement. On the contrary, we believe that providing participants with such a choice, 
while informing them of results and furnishing relevant medical recommendations and 
referral sources, will discharge any duty that researchers may owe.
II. Intersection of Clinical Care and Research Ethics
A. Ethics in Research and Clinical Care
Critical consideration of automatic placement of individual research results, both primary 
and incidental, in participants’ medical records prompts an examination of the increasingly 
blurred line between clinical care and research. Individualized treatment is the fundamental 
difference between clinical care and the collection of generalizable data in the conduct of 
research. However, the general category of research with human subjects comprises a 
spectrum of possible interactions with participants, even if the intent to contribute to 
generalizable knowledge is the overarching goal. Consequently, the ethical duties that may 
arise in particular studies are highly context-sensitive.
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Despite these complexities, clinicians and researchers have some common moral ground in 
their relationships with their respective patients and participants. First, while exceptions 
exist, both relationships are based upon consent. In addition, patient care and research share 
several guiding principles, such as respect for persons, beneficence, non-maleficence, and 
justice. Therefore, both realms seek to balance these principles by allowing autonomous 
individuals to govern their choices, while protecting vulnerable individuals; avoiding or 
mitigating harms; and ensuring fair treatment. These shared foundations are apparent to both 
clinicians and to researchers, though in slightly different ways. Clinicians are bound by 
ethical codes and their practice is overseen by state licensing boards. There is no similar 
state-regulated licensed practice of research, but researchers from widely different 
disciplines find related elements in their relevant ethical codes and in federal human subjects 
research regulations.
When a study is squarely aimed at generalizable knowledge, both clinician and non-clinician 
researchers may be comfortable with the idea that any responsibilities toward the participant 
can be discharged within the research relationship. This comfort may be reinforced by the 
emphasis on subject choice and voluntary participation in research relationships. For 
example, researchers have historically disclosed clinically relevant results and provided 
referrals directly to participants without breaching the confidentiality of the research 
relationship by directly informing clinicians of results.2
Research guidance, such as the Belmont Report and the Common Rule, does not mandate 
confidentiality, yet many researchers promise confidentiality in order to respect participants 
and minimize harms that might result from disclosure of sensitive or personal information.3 
Some studies go so far as to secure a Certificate of Confidentiality, which provides 
assurances to participants that researchers will not have to disclose identifiable research 
information in response to legal demands.4 If researchers have promised confidentiality to 
participants, then disclosure of research information to those outside of the study, including 
by placing information in a medical record, could be a violation of this promise. Although 
the clinical and medical records realms have privacy protections under the Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), these protections allow for many more 
disclosures of health information than the typical research consent.5
But when the research involves the prospect of direct health benefit to an individual who is 
both a subject and a patient, both clinician and non-clinician researchers may decide that 
further steps are necessary to discharge their respective duties. In such a context, a clinician-
researcher may subordinate his or her research role to that of clinician. Given the potential 
involvement of professional obligations, a clinician-researcher’s perceived duty to include 
research data in the medical record may be accorded great weight. However, all decisions to 
breach the confidentiality of the research data — in this case by placement of the results 
outside the protections of the study — must still be interrogated under the core principles 
fundamental to the conduct of all human subjects research. While arguments for particular 
actions by researchers may grow stronger when research results could have direct benefit to 
the participant, it is not clear that those arguments should ever overcome the preferences of 
the participant.
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The blurring of research and clinical care also raises concerns of therapeutic misconception. 
Therapeutic misconception occurs when research participants inaccurately understand the 
distinctions between research and clinical care and believe that researchers are acting in the 
participant’s best medical interests rather than seeking generalizable knowledge.6 
Therapeutic misconception is a threat not only to participants, but to investigators as well.7 
If returning results in and of itself may lead to therapeutic misconception, placing the results 
directly into a medical record can only add to this confusion. While it may be possible to 
clearly explain the demarcation between receiving results in research that may need to be 
followed-up in clinical care,8 it is much more difficult to explain the distinction when the 
research team is reaching across the boundary and placing results in a clinical medical 
record.
B. Translational Genomic Research
The National Human Genome Research Institute (NHGRI) has recently shifted its focus 
toward translational genomics research. In 2011, Eric Green and Mark Guyer mapped the 
goals of genomic research for NHGRI, with a strong focus on translating basic genomic 
research to clinical care — from bench to bedside.9 Accordingly, many recent studies have 
been designed as research with clinically beneficial elements, and therefore implicate some 
of the tensions between clinical and research ethics discussed above.
NHGRI recently established two broad grant funding categories that specifically focus on 
the clinical applications of genomics. Announced in 2007, the Electronic Medical Records 
and Genomics (eMERGE) Network is comprised of nine funded studies aimed at merging 
DNA biorepositories with EMRs.10 A primary goal of the eMERGE project is to “explore 
the best avenues to incorporate genetic variants into EMR for use in clinical care such as 
improvement of genetic risk assessment, prevention, diagnosis, treatment, and/or 
accessibility of genomic medicine.”11 A second NHGRI grant program, the Clinical 
Sequencing Exploratory Research (CSER) program, began in 2010 with the goal of 
supporting “both the methods development needed to integrate sequencing into the clinic 
and the ethical, legal, and psychosocial research required to responsibly apply personal 
genomic sequence data to medical care.”12 There are currently eight funded CSER projects 
and nine funded sub-projects within the CSER grant program that explore ethical, legal, and 
social implications of return of results.13
The eMERGE and CSER projects blur the lines between clinical care and research, with 
both consortiums heavily focused on patients, medical records, and genomics. The 
eMERGE Network research compares genomic variants with existing phenotypic 
information in individual medical records to understand the genetic bases of disease and 
analyzes how to incorporate the genetic variants back into a patient’s EMR.14 The 2010 
CSER application instructions specifically called for a detailed plan of how individual 
genomic research results generated in studies of patients as participants could be 
incorporated into their medical records.15 The funded projects have varied in their approach 
to this mandate, although only the CSER at University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill 
permits participants to decide whether or not their results are placed into their medical 
records.16 Given the size and broad scope of the eMERGE and CSER networks, future 
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research projects of all kinds may look to these studies for research standards, especially 
regarding medical records. Their prominence may prove problematic unless careful attention 
is given to the trend toward automatic placement and the implications this may bring.
II. Historical Arc of Return of Genomic Research Results
A. Whether to Return Results and Which to Return
Historically, prevailing research standards barred participant access to either individual or 
aggregate research findings;17 however, over the past two decades, this strong stance has 
softened. There is now a consensus that aggregate results should be made available to 
participants in all research.18 The position on return of individual research results has also 
evolved, from non-return to a return only in exceptional circumstances19 to, in the case of 
genomic research, a consensus on return of clinically valid and medically actionable results 
that could develop into a standard of care.20
Once a consensus emerged that some research results should be returned, or at least offered, 
to participants, considerations turned to determining which results to return. Whole-exome 
sequencing provides data for over 20,000 genes, leading to an overwhelming amount of 
potential returnable information.21 This information can range from raw genomic data to 
interpreted results. The interpreted results can provide information about variants associated 
with serious diseases, such as cancer and Alzheimer’s, or with innocuous traits, such as the 
ability to roll one’s tongue. Sequencing analysis can also identify variants of uncertain 
significance (VUS), alterations that are not yet known to be deleterious or benign, in genes 
associated with specific diseases. A genomics study may be designed to explore a very 
specific problem or genetic variant — the primary finding — but sequencing can produce 
additional findings not related to the object of the study but discovered during the course of 
the research — incidental findings.22 In many cases, the determination of whether a variant 
is pathogenic, of unknown significance, or benign cannot be adjudicated solely by computer 
analytics, but requires human interpretation of how a novel variant fits into evolving 
genotypic and phenotypic knowledge.23
The decision to return particular research findings to participants typically hinges on three 
interpretive factors: analytic validity, clinical validity, and medical actionability.24 Analytic 
and clinical validity refer, respectively, to the accuracy of the test — that is, does it 
accurately report the DNA sequence — and the ability of the sequencing to identify a 
clinical condition or predisposition.25 Medical actionability, or clinical utility, generally is 
dependent upon whether the genetic test result can inform treatment decisions or provide 
opportunities for disease prevention.26 A growing consensus argues that medically 
actionable results should be offered to participants and that researchers have discretion to 
offer a broader range of results, such as those without clinical utility or VUSs.27
However, while many agree that medically actionable results should be returned, the 
definition of medical actionability is not universally agreed-upon.28 Additionally, results 
pertaining to non-treatable diseases may be relevant to some people or important for 
reproductive decision-making.29 Studies have documented that individuals may be 
interested in receiving research results for reasons beyond medical actionability, such as 
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personal or reproductive utility.30 Some researchers have agreed that participants should be 
able to receive research results that are personally meaningful, even if not clinically 
relevant,31 and that keeping non-clinically useful results from participants may disrespect 
their right to decide for themselves what information they want to learn.32 Nonetheless, the 
majority of recommendations regarding returning research results currently focus only on 
medical actionability, narrowly defined in terms of utility in treatment or prevention.33
Generally, variants are described dichotomously as medically actionable or not. This 
characterization is typically based on broad variant and population information, not on an 
individualized assessment of age, circumstances, and values. Some studies do take 
individual factors into account when determining which results to return,34 but others may 
decide to return a certain set of “medically actionable” variants to the entire research 
population regardless of individual characteristics. However, these characteristics will often 
alter the practical utility of the available interventions. Although a genetic variant may be 
associated with a medically actionable condition, the condition will not have the same 
temporality for all individuals tested. For example, a child or young adult tested for a variant 
associated with an adult-onset condition or an elderly adult tested for a variant associated 
with phenotypes that typically appear in a person’s forties or fifties may not have any 
appropriate clinical actions available, even though the condition is medically actionable in 
the abstract.
C. How to Return Results
Although there has been much discussion regarding the whether and which questions of 
returning individual research results to participants, the discussion regarding how to return 
the results has been more limited. Past genomic studies have varied greatly in the design of 
return of results. Along the continuum from providing research results without counseling to 
providing clinical care as part of the research design, there are many points where one could 
potentially draw the boundary of the researcher’s duty. As part of answering the how 
question, researchers must also decide who should give results (specifically, whether they 
should be delivered by a genetic counselor or other genetics professional) and to whom the 
information should be given (that is, whether family members should also receive 
information about or be tested for potentially clinically relevant variants).
In the most limited view of a researcher’s duty, a researcher can simply provide the 
participant with results in the form of a letter. However, commentators have argued that this 
approach may be both ethically and legally inadequate and that researchers are obligated to 
make some effort to convey the clinical importance of the results and to refer for appropriate 
follow-up care.35 That raises the further question of what researchers must do to satisfy this 
obligation. The possibilities include providing a list of resources for a participant’s own 
follow up, giving a referral to a provider, actually securing a follow-up appointment for the 
participant with that provider, or even paying for or providing follow-up care through the 
researcher’s study.36 The translational goals of current genomic research, the prospect of 
benefit to research participants, and the involvement of clinician-researchers inform much of 
the ongoing discussions about offering results, making appropriate referrals, and extending a 
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study design beyond the research relationship. What, however, is the appropriate limit of the 
researcher’s duty? We turn next to the various dimensions of this question.
IV. Is There a Duty to Place Research Results in Medical Records?
If a researcher has a duty to refer participants to follow-up care that is medically 
recommended given certain genomic research findings, at what point has the researcher 
successfully discharged this duty? Specifically, does the discharge of this duty necessarily 
entail a medical record entry? If a participant, upon return of results from the researcher, 
objects to further disclosure of the results — such as by entry into a medical record — is 
there a duty that supports disregarding that preference? Would such a practice benefit 
research participants? Could it cause undue harms? And could anyone but a licensed 
clinician place a finding into a medical record? In this section, we explore the ethical, 
professional, legal, and regulatory duties that are at work when determining whether 
researchers should place study results in participants’ medical records.
A. Ethical Duties
There are three guiding ethical principles in research that must be balanced in the 
determination of whether to place genomic research results in a participant’s medical record 
without consent: respect for persons, of which respect for autonomy is a part, beneficence, 
and non-maleficence. A researcher may desire to place results, especially medically 
actionable results, in a medical record in order to discharge duties of beneficence and non-
maleficence. Under this view, a researcher should promote medically advised interventions 
to prevent or mitigate potential disease and placement in the medical records will ostensibly 
help ensure this goal. However, respect for participant autonomy argues in favor of a 
research participant deciding whether research results are entered into their medical record. 
If a researcher decides that he or she knows what is best for the participant, disregarding the 
autonomous participant’s preferences, then the resulting paternalistic placement of results in 
the medical record requires strong justification. Researchers may appeal to the importance of 
the results and the danger of possible participant inaction as justification. That is, they may 
believe that the importance of the research result cannot otherwise be conveyed sufficiently 
to propel the participant to seek follow-up care that the researcher views as essential.
Allowing participants to decide what to do with their research results may be alarming to 
researchers who believe that there is a single proper response for participants who receive 
medically actionable findings. While it is foreseeable that many participants will opt to place 
genomic research results in their medical record and choose to discuss the results with their 
physicians in order to begin the recommended follow-up, there are rational reasons why 
individuals may not do so. For example, some people may have concerns about how such 
information can affect eligibility for life, long-term care, or disability insurance;37 they may 
be years or decades away from the point when clinical preventive measures would begin and 
wish to bring genomic information into the clinical realm only when clearly relevant; or they 
may wish to process the information or inform family members before devoting energy to 
deciding whether and how their clinical care should be affected.
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Respect for autonomy is also the ethical principle underlying both a participant’s right not to 
know research results and to withdraw from research. The implications of both of these 
rights argue against automatic placement of results in a medical record. A recent consensus 
statement by several researchers involved in the eMERGE and CSER projects — projects 
that, on the whole, automatically place research results into medical records — noted that 
“participants have a right to decline to receive genomic results, even when doing so may be 
viewed as a threat to the participant’s health.”38 If respecting autonomy permits participants 
to opt out of receiving results, then a natural extension of that respect is allowing them to 
decide whether results are placed in the medical record, even if the researcher believes that 
not doing so may cause harm.
Participants also typically have a right to withdraw from research. Researchers must explain 
before participation begins how a participant could withdraw as well as any limitations on 
that right. The transfer of research findings into a medical record makes understanding the 
rights associated with withdrawal particularly important. Once the findings are entered into 
the record, the confidentiality of research data has been breached. These data now have their 
own life in a separate, clinical world, making complete withdrawal from the initial research 
difficult, if not impossible.39
Automatic placement of results into the medical record in order to discharge the researchers’ 
duties of beneficence and non-maleficence is problematic for several reasons. First, 
participants’ preferences about how to manage this information are ignored in favor of 
increasing the chances that an unknown physician will have access to the information in the 
future. In this way, the unknown physician is treated as a more reliable agent than the 
participant, presumably because of physicians’ medical knowledge. However, a patient’s 
physician may lack the knowledge needed to interpret genomic findings or provide 
appropriate follow-up care or may disagree with the findings’ rele-vance.40 Moreover, 
research results and their management impact not only participants’ medical interests but 
also their familial, economic, emotional, and social interests.41 Participants, not physicians, 
are in a better position to take all of these interests into account when determining how to 
manage their research findings. If participants were deemed competent enough to weigh the 
risks and benefits and provide informed consent to participate in the research study, they 
should be trusted to make determinations about how to manage the information that is 
generated about them.
Second, the EMR infrastructure is currently not configured to adequately sort and present 
the vast amounts of genomic data produced by whole genome and whole exome 
sequencing.42 Many commentators are concerned that genomic research results that lack 
clinical validity or utility will end up in the medical record and cause misunderstanding and 
anxiety for the participants, or be misinterpreted by general practitioners not properly trained 
in genomic analysis.43 Although many genomic research studies only return results with 
clinical validity and utility, this is not always the case and the situation may change in the 
future. Also, when sequencing is done in research, the lab may convey all information in a 
single report that mixes clinically valid with non-clinically valid results and contains VUSs. 
Therefore, it may be difficult in practice to prevent non-clinically actionable information 
from ending up in the medical record.
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Finally, placement alone has no guaranteed impact on health. It is widely recognized that 
many physicians lack sufficient training to understand the clinical relevance of and properly 
interpret genomic information that may be in the medical record.44 Placing research findings 
in a participant’s medical record at the clinical institution where the research was conducted 
may be futile if the participant’s physician is not associated with that institution or the 
participant does not intend to seek follow-up medical care there. Additionally, even if the 
individual desires follow-up care, there is no guarantee that an insurance company will 
reimburse the costs for preventive interventions, leaving some unable to pay for the 
recommended medical actions. Given the lack of a single medical record and limited 
physician training, it is problematic to rely heavily on the power of medical records as a 
repository for genetic risk and a guarantor of proper follow-up care.
A researcher’s decision to place a participant’s research results into a patient’s medical 
record certainly does “translate” research into clinical care.45 However, it does so 
dangerously, taking away the participant’s ability to decide whether and when to move this 
information from the research to clinical realm. Even if most participants would likely agree 
with the researcher’s views of appropriate next steps in clinical care, ethical considerations 
argue strongly for providing participants the choice for whether a researcher places results 
into the medical records.46 Without such an option, researchers who are placing results in 
medical records are weighing beneficence over participant autonomy, but with little 
assurance of the beneficent results.
B. Professional Duties
The professional ethics guidelines of those who conduct genomic research might provide 
another source of relevant authority. In this context we mean “profession” in the narrow 
sense of an occupation that requires a high level of skill and, in consequence, is granted 
special privileges by the government, most importantly the power to control entry through 
licensing and the right and duty of self-regulation.47 Professional self-regulation usually 
involves written ethical codes or rules, the violation of which can lead to discipline and even 
loss of license. Scientific researchers in general do not comprise a profession in this sense. 
However, members of other professions often participate in research, and are potentially 
bound by their respective professions’ ethical rules when doing so. This is particularly true 
when, as in the case of genomic research, a project may have elements of both pure 
scientific research and clinical practice.
We analyzed the professional ethical codes of two licensed professions whose members 
regularly participate in genomic research: medicine and genetic counseling. These two 
groups of professionals often participate in ways that may put them in relationships with 
research participants that the professionals or the participants may perceive as clinical. In 
each case, we examined whether the respective profession’s ethical rules impose or suggest 
an ethical duty to place genomic research results in the participant’s medical record. If so, 
then these professionals would presumably have to draw a clearly defined line: I must put 
the results in the medical record, or risk professional sanctions. The consequence would be 
that these professionals could not participate in research unless the results were put in the 
medical record.
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We find, however, that neither medicine nor genetic counseling appears to have a rule that 
deals with this question. In medicine, we began with the example of the rules prescribed in 
our own state of North Carolina by the state licensing agency, the North Carolina Medical 
Board.48 These rules, which are incorporated into the North Carolina Administrative Code 
and thus have the force of law, do not mention anything related to either medical records or 
research; they deal for the most part with procedural and administrative issues. The Board 
also issues advisory “Position Statements” on a range of topics, including one on “Medical 
Record Documentation.”49 Position Statements such as this purport to “reflect commonly 
accepted standards” and “encourage” new developments — in this case “the trend towards 
the use of electronic medical records.”50 However, as with the North Carolina rules, this 
position statement says nothing that sheds any light on the question that this paper addresses.
In addition to mandatory rules issued by state medical boards, the American Medical 
Association’s Code of Medical Ethics has, since the mid-1800s, provided a set of voluntary 
guidelines. The Code takes the form of an Introduction followed by sets of Opinions on nine 
general topics. Here again, nothing addresses, even indirectly, the question of a professional 
duty to place genomic research results in a medical record.
Opinion 2.07, “Clinical Investigation,” does support the general premise that physicians 
participating in research are bound by medical ethics: “In conducting clinical investigation, 
the investigator should demonstrate the same concern and caution for the welfare, safety, 
and comfort of the person involved as is required of a physician who is furnishing medical 
care to a patient independent of any clinical investigation.”51 In the case of “clinical 
investigation primarily for treatment,” “[t]he physician must recognize that the patient-
physician relationship exists and that professional judgment and skill must be exercised in 
the best interest of the patient.”52 In a clinical investigation, primarily for treatment, then, 
there is no doubt that the research participant is a patient in a professional relationship with 
the physician-researcher. Even though the Opinion is silent on the point, it is possible that 
the physician-researcher would interpret his or her duty to the participant-patient as 
including a duty to place results in the medical record, especially if the rules of the 
physician’s hospital or practice so required.
However, “[i]n clinical investigation primarily for the accumulation of scientific 
knowledge,” — the principal focus of this paper — there is no reference to the existence of a 
physician-patient relationship, and the Opinion offers only a general statement of the 
applicable ethical standard:
Adequate safeguards must be provided for the welfare, safety, and comfort of the 
subject. It is fundamental social policy that the advancement of scientific knowledge 
must always be secondary to primary concern for the individual.53
There is no suggestion about how to apply these general principles to the present question.
The same is true of Opinion 2.079, “Safeguards in the Use of DNA Databanks in Genomic 
Research.” To the extent that this opinion is relevant at all, it might be read as according 
primacy to the privacy interest of the participant. Paragraph 3(a) provides: “Special 
emphasis should be placed on disclosing the specific standards of privacy contained in the 
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study: whether the material will be coded (ie: encrypted so that only the investigator can 
trace materials back to specific individuals) or be completely de-identified (ie: stripped of 
identifiers).”54 This is complemented by paragraph (4), which provides: “To strengthen the 
protection of confidentiality, genomic research should not be conducted using information 
and samples that identify the individuals from whom they were obtained (ie: by name or 
social security number).”55 Opinion 2.139, “Multiplex Genetic Testing,” also stresses 
potential harms to the patient from test results: “Multiplex testing and its resultant 
information may also have widespread societal implications that include discriminatory 
practices against not only individuals but specific ethnic groups that have been designated 
‘at risk’ populations.”56 Finally, Opinion 7.05, “Retention of Medical Records,” deals with 
several issues relating to the retention of records, but says or implies nothing about what 
should go into them.57
According to the National Society of Genetic Counselors, 15 states currently license genetic 
counseling as a profession, while licensure provisions are pending in four others.58 By its 
own account, the NCGS is a voluntary organization that, among other activities, advocates 
for professional licensing; toward this end, it provides model legislation for state 
governments. The NCGS has issued a Code of Ethics.59 Aside from being voluntary, it is 
purely aspirational, as each of its four sections begins, “genetic counselors strive to…” None 
of its provisions deal in any way with medical records. The only conceivably relevant 
provision, section II.4, stresses well-informed decisions by clients: “Enable their clients to 
make informed decisions, free of coercion, by providing or illuminating the necessary facts, 
and clarifying the alternatives and anticipated consequences.”60 In fact, the very use of the 
word “client” suggests that a recipient of genetic counseling is something other than a 
traditional medical patient.
To summarize, the question of whether to place genomic research results into a participant’s 
medical record cannot be resolved by recourse to binding standards of professional 
responsibility. Such standards appear not to address this question at all, nor do they imply 
the correctness of any particular answer.
C. Legal Duties
Clinician-researchers are concerned not only with their ethical and professional duties, but 
also with whether they are opening themselves up to legal claims by failing to place research 
results in medical records. This concern leads to the question of whether the law creates a 
duty to place research results in a participant’s medical record. The current answer to that 
question is clearly no: at present, there is no statutory, regulatory, or case law that imposes 
such a duty on researchers. In fact, there is little or no scholarly writing that even debates the 
desirability or feasibility of such a duty on a theoretical level. However, as we discuss in this 
section, there is a substantial literature that addresses the related question of whether 
researchers have a legal duty to disclose medically actionable information to research 
participants, particularly incidental findings.
The putative duties to disclose to the participant and then to record in the medical record are 
related in that both would require a researcher first to recognize and then to respond to a 
research finding that could have significant health implications for the participant. The first 
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part of each duty — to recognize the finding — seems identical in the two instances. But the 
second or response part, the conduct that is sufficient and necessary to discharge the duty to 
recognize, is different. In the instance of a duty to disclose, the researcher must explain the 
finding to the participant; in the instance of a duty to record, the required response is to put a 
note in the medical record. Logically, a duty to place a finding in the medical record would 
strongly imply a duty to tell the participant. It would make little sense to record something 
that is material to the participant’s current and future healthcare but not to tell the 
participant. This logic is less compelling in the opposite direction, however. As we have 
noted, there are many reasons that participants would desire disclosed results not to be 
recorded. Thus, the two formulations of the duty to respond will overlap in many cases, but 
by no means all. Nonetheless, the overlap is substantial enough that the duty to disclose 
literature, read against the background of some established principles of medical malpractice 
law, can inform how a duty to place research results in the medical record might evolve in 
the future.
It is already common practice to return primary research findings, so most literature 
discussing legal duties regarding return of results focus primarily on incidental findings. The 
literature on the return of incidental findings is, and has long been, unanimous on one point: 
there is “no explicit legal duty to disclose in the United States.”61 In fact, as one very recent 
review concludes, “There is no law or case law directly on point.”62
Despite this lack of law, researchers continue to worry about the possibility of legal 
liability.63 Those who worry about possible legal liability tend to start, as we do, with a 
presumed ethical consensus to offer to return some findings.64 The effort to translate this 
presumed ethical duty into an impending legal duty quickly bogs down in a tangle of 
attenuated analogies, to which we turn next.
Most of the concern about possible legal liability for failure to return research findings is 
rooted in tort law, and in particular the law of negligence, of which professional malpractice 
is a branch. A negligence case requires proof that the defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff, 
that the defendant breached that duty, and that the breach caused compensable harm to the 
plaintiff. Where the conduct in question is that of a professional such as a physician or 
lawyer, a special duty is created by the professional relationship (as between doctor and 
patient) and the conduct must meet the standard of care required of similar professionals in 
similar circumstances. This higher duty is often characterized as a fiduciary duty, a duty to 
act always in the best interest of a patient who is assumed to be at a significant knowledge 
disadvantage and thus inherently vulnerable and dependent. As we will explore shortly, 
whether researchers have a fiduciary or other special duty to research participants is a 
vexing question.
Under most circumstances “tort law imposes no affirmative duties to act for another’s 
benefit, and individuals are not required to warn others of impending harm.”65 Put 
somewhat differently, while they must avoid doing harm, ordinary people generally have no 
legal duty to take action to help or even rescue others. However, there are exceptional 
situations where the law might disregard the general rule and impose liability. These 
situations include special relationships, the presence of contractual agreements that 
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supersede the general rule, the voluntary assumption of a higher duty, and a party’s 
possession of superior skills, training, and ability.66 In other words, “legal obligations are 
generally role specific.”67
There is no doubt that medical professionals in a clinical setting can have a duty to notice, 
disclose, and sometimes act upon findings that they are not looking for. Thus, several cases 
have recognized that clinical radiologists may have an affirmative duty to discover and 
disclose incidental findings.68 The existence of such a duty derives from several of the 
exceptional circumstances noted above: the special fiduciary relationship between a 
physician and patient — even a physician like a radiologist whom the patient neither selects 
nor consults directly; the physician’s assumption of a duty toward the patient; and the 
physician’s superior skill, training, and ability.
What are the implications of these legal doctrines for the return of research findings? A 
researcher who does disclose research findings but does so negligently could potentially be 
held liable under principles of ordinary negligence.69 It might even be argued that if a 
researcher did disclose, but then did not record, this would be negligent completion of an act 
— returning results — already undertaken. However, in order to succeed on such a claim, a 
participant plaintiff would have to prove that the researcher’s failure to place the results in 
the medical records caused harm, such as the occurrence of a preventable illness. Assuming 
that the researcher told the plaintiff of the results and their clinical significance, it would be 
difficult for the plaintiff to prove that it was not his or her lack of action in response to such 
a disclosure, rather than the researcher’s lack of action, that caused the harm. Thus, our 
primary concern is with a failure to return potentially actionable findings, which, for legal 
purposes, would be a failure to act as opposed to an act undertaken but negligently executed.
Transposed into the research context, the no-affirmative-duty-to-help rule would imply that 
researchers are generally under no affirmative duty to act for their subjects’ benefit, and thus 
have no duty to warn subjects of findings that might portend harm. But could the failure to 
disclose research findings fall under one of the exceptions to the no-affirmative-duty-to-help 
rule?
There is currently no legal authority for the proposition that a researcher has a fiduciary duty 
to a participant.70 This has been the case notwithstanding widespread documentation of the 
“therapeutic misconception,” meaning that research participants often believe that they will 
receive clinical medical care, regardless of any disclaimers they are given. If a fiduciary 
duty were found, the literature speculates, it would probably be as a result of some special 
features of the researcher’s profile or the research project that made the therapeutic 
misconception even more plausible to participants.71 For example, a researcher who was 
also the participant-patient’s clinical physician might conceivably be held to have a 
fiduciary duty even with respect to the research aspects of the relationship. More generally, 
researchers who are also clinicians might be somewhat more likely to be held to a fiduciary 
duty, especially if participants knew that status. A research project in which participation 
“looked” more like clinical care — for example, with lengthy in-person consultations rather 
than mere submission of a saliva sample — might also incline a court toward finding a 
fiduciary duty.
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It has also been suggested that “immediately actionable findings” might trigger a “common 
law duty to rescue” even in the absence of a fiduciary duty, but this argument finds — at 
best — only attenuated support in current law.72 Finally, if an informed consent document 
were treated as a contract, it could possibly create a contractual duty to disclose. On their 
face, they have some of the attributes of contracts. The typical contract involves an 
exchange of promises: I agree to do this, and in return you agree to do that. An informed 
consent document might be read as an exchange of the participant’s promise to participate in 
return for the various commitments made by the researcher. However, researchers make 
every effort to ensure that such documents are not treated as contracts, courts have usually 
not treated them as contracts, and they are also written so as to minimize any duties owed to 
subjects.73
In any event, all of this is mere theorizing. There is currently no legal authority for the 
proposition that a researcher must disclose incidental findings to a participant. Although, as 
with all case law, this could change at any time, there is no reason to suspect that such a 
change is imminent. As we argued above, it is all but impossible to envision a duty to enter 
research findings into the medical record absent an underlying duty to disclose. We 
therefore conclude that — at least for now — researchers do not face legal liability if they 
fail to put research findings in a participant’s medical records.
D. Regulatory Duties
Another important issue is whether there are any government regulations that require or 
prohibit the inclusion of research findings in participants’ medical records. There are two 
regulatory frameworks that provide guidance for return of results in genom-ics research: the 
Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments of 1988 (CLIA) and the Common Rule. 
Neither requires that results be placed in medical records; on the contrary, the Common Rule 
would likely support non-placement in the medical records given its requirement to 
minimize risk to research participants. Although regulatory guidance for research conducted 
under the purview of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is not identical to the 
Common Rule, it does require similar efforts to minimize participant risk.74
CLIA contains several provisions that are relevant to this discussion. Broadly, CLIA 
regulates laboratories that perform analysis for clinical care to ensure that they meet 
specified quality standards.75 Several genomic research studies have returned research 
results directly to participants. This means that subjects receive results generated in a 
research laboratory (research grade) that are not confirmed by repeating the testing in a 
CLIA-compliant clinical laboratory (clinical grade).76 For example, the Familial Dilated 
Cardiomyopathy Research Project searched for gene variants through a research laboratory. 
When results showed suspected meaningful results, participants were notified and 
encouraged to pursue genetic counseling and undertake confirmatory testing in a clinical 
lab.77 The participants were notified by a letter, written by a genetic counselor, and were 
given comprehensive information and referrals for clinical genetic counselors and 
laboratories.78 However, the return of research-grade results directly to research participants 
without additional clinical-grade testing may be a violation of CLIA.79
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Research laboratories are exempt from CLIA’s requirements unless they “report patient 
specific results for the diagnosis, prevention or treatment of any disease or impairment of, or 
the assessment of the health of individual patients.”80 Because the CLIA regulations do not 
define diagnosis, prevention, or treatment, interpretations of what rises to this level vary.81 
Some argue that any research result returned to an individual requires certification by a 
CLIA laboratory,82 but this position has been criticized as too extreme because it would 
require CLIA certification of results returned for all purposes, not just for diagnosis, 
prevention, or treatment.83 Others have argued that the return of research results is not 
clinical care and thus cannot be within the scope of CLIA.84 Under this conception of return, 
there may not be a CLIA violation if results are given directly to participants for 
informational purposes only, with the advice that clinical confirmation and follow-up should 
be sought.85 However, Wolf and colleagues note that if individuals’ results may be used to 
“assess health or trigger such assessment,” CLIA confirmation may be necessary before 
results are returned.86 Researchers currently have no concrete best practice guidelines on the 
issue.87
Whether CLIA confirmation is legally required remains an open question. However, given 
that a violation of CLIA requirements can result in criminal penalties and that certain 
journals may not accept publication of study findings in research returned without CLIA 
certification, it is likely that many researchers will opt to undergo CLIA confirmation before 
returning results to participants.88 If researchers adopt CLIA confirmation as a usual 
practice, the practical effect will be that the presumed ethical duty to return results will 
include a further duty to seek CLIA confirmation — even though CLIA does not mandate 
return of results in the first place.
Must CLIA-confirmed results be entered into a medical record? Even assuming that one 
must confirm research results in a CLIA-certified laboratory before returning them, it does 
not inevitably follow that CLIA results must be placed into medical records. Under CLIA, 
laboratories are permitted to release results only to “authorized persons,” as defined by 
federal regulations and state law,89 and are required to keep detailed records of the lab 
request, analysis, and results. Authorized persons are defined with reference to state law,90 
although recent federal regulations clarify that individual patients are authorized to receive 
laboratory results under HIPAA even if they are not considered authorized users under state 
law.91 While CLIA allows laboratories to transfer results to medical records upon the 
request of an authorized person, it does not mandate this transfer.
Nor does CLIA mandate in any other way that research results, even those clinically 
confirmed, be placed in the medical records. For example, researchers can obtain results 
from CLIA-certified laboratories by submitting samples with unique identifiers for analysis 
and, as authorized persons, receiving the results linked to the identifiers. The researchers 
could then link the research participants’ identities to the identifiers and return the CLIA-
based results directly to the participants.
A second important regulation, the Common Rule,92 may argue against placement. The 
pressure on clinicians to place information in medical records has begun to pervade the 
research setting. However, as discussed above, the duties and potential liabilities of 
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researchers are very different from those of clinicians. Additionally, researchers have a duty 
to minimize unnecessary exposure of participants to risk, specifically in the context of the 
Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA) and potential genetic discrimination.93
In the clinical context, physicians face difficult decisions about which genetic information to 
include in medical records and many feel legal and ethical pressure to ensure that all genetic 
information is documented.94 Clinicians’ concerns range from fear of medical malpractice, 
either from the patient or a patient’s family member, to the belief that it is unethical or 
illegal to “hide” genetic information from insurers or employers.95 GINA greatly limits the 
ability of covered employers and health insurance companies to collect genetic information 
from medical records.96 For example, health insurers can only request genetic information 
from medical records for limited research purposes or to determine whether to pay for a 
procedure such as prophylactic surgery.97 Other insurance companies, such as life, long-
term care, or disability insurers, are permitted to collect and use genetic information housed 
in medical records when patients provide permission — a necessary condition of any 
insurance application.
Under GINA, if an employer or health insurer makes a medical records request that does not 
fall under one of GINA’s exceptions for the collection of genetic information, the requesting 
entity must state that genetic information, including family medical history, should not be 
included in the information that the healthcare facility provides.98 The burden is on the 
healthcare facility to redact genetic information from the copy of the record that is sent — a 
practice that is probably far from universal. By placing genomic research results into the 
medical record, researchers are increasing the chances that employers and health insurance 
companies will get genetic information, which the individual has a legal right to keep from 
them. This inclusion thus increases the risk of harms to the participant. Allowing 
participants to decide whether to place their results in their medical records would align with 
the goals of the Common Rule by providing participants the opportunity to minimize harms.
VI. Conclusion
There is an emerging consensus that researchers have a duty to return clinically useful 
results to individual participants; however, the boundaries of this duty are not well defined. 
This uncertainty generates situations that may put research participants’ interests at risk. 
Specifically, in an effort to meet their duty to return results, numerous genomics research 
projects have decided not only to disclose clinically useful findings to their subjects, but to 
enter the clinical realm by actions such as clinician conversations or automatic placement in 
the participants’ clinical medical record.
This practice can cause harm to participants on many levels, however. Automatic placement 
in the medical record denies participants the opportunity to take the time they believe is 
necessary to process their results, both practically and emotionally, and perhaps discussing it 
with their relatives, before determining what course of action is best for them, constraining 
their autonomy without sufficient justification. Not only may placement in the medical 
record fail to result in a benefit to the individual, it may also negatively impact research 
participants in a number of tangible ways. If included in the medical record, research results 
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related to genomic health risks can affect a participant’s ability to obtain life, disability, and 
long-term care insurance, which are not protected under GINA. It may also jeopardize 
participants’ privacy interests and put them at risk for employment discrimination by 
increasing the chances that their employers gain access to their genomic risk information. 
Moreover, once this information is placed in their medical record, there is little they can do 
to remove it.
Given the number of potential negative consequences associated with this practice, we 
sought to examine if there are any ethical, professional, legal, or regulatory obstacles that 
may prevent researchers from giving participants a choice about whether to include 
individual research results in their medical record. We find that there are no such obstacles.
From a research ethics perspective, the principle of beneficence suggests that researchers 
should act in a way that promotes the well-being of participants. Some may argue that this 
means that researchers should automatically place individual research findings in 
participants’ medical record to increase the chances that participants’ clinicians will have 
access to genomic risk information in order to help prevent or minimize health-related risks. 
However, giving participants a choice about this issue will not jeopardize the care of those 
participants who wish to seek preventive measures. First, many participants may choose to 
include clinically useful research findings in their medical records. Second, those 
participants who choose not to immediately place this information in their medical record 
may still do so in the future, authorizing their clinician to add it to their medical record in the 
course of seeking guidance about available preventive measures.
Even if most participants would choose to place research findings in their medical records, 
giving them a choice respects their autonomy. If they were capable of consenting to the 
research study, it seems to follow that they have the capacity to make determinations about 
how to manage the results that emerge from that study. In addition, giving participants a 
choice allows them to make a more comprehensive calculation of the risks and benefits of 
including this information in their medical record, considering not just their health interests, 
but also their familial, economic, emotional, and social interests.
We also argue that there are no professional, legal, or regulatory duties that preclude 
researchers from giving participants a choice about the inclusion of research findings in the 
medical record. Physicians and genetic counselors often participate as researchers in 
genomics studies; however, the professional ethics guidelines that apply to these 
professionals do not address this question, let alone specify a duty to preempt the 
participant’s choice. Furthermore, from a legal perspective, researchers are not in a fiduciary 
relationship with participants and they do not have an affirmative duty-to-help that requires 
them even to disclose individual research findings to participants. Absent an underlying duty 
to disclose, a duty to place findings in a medical record is inconceivable. Finally, from a 
regulatory perspective, there is no requirement that researchers automatically place research 
findings in medical records. CLIA may require that research findings be verified in a CLIA-
certified laboratory before they are returned to participants, but it does not mandate the 
placement of these findings in participants’ medical records.
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We find neither ethical, legal, professional, or regulatory duties that require placement of 
genomic research results in medical records nor any duties that prohibit such a practice. 
Therefore, researchers have discretion to decide whether to do so. However, while the 
automatic placement of participants’ research findings in medical records is driven by an 
interest in helping participants minimize or prevent the risk of health-related harms, this 
practice could also have a number of negative consequences. We believe that the best policy 
is to give participants a choice about the placement of research findings in their medical 
records so that they can weigh the risks and benefits of such action by taking into account all 
of their relevant personal interests. The clinical utility of genomic information generated in 
the course of research makes it difficult to distinguish between the research and the clinical 
worlds, but researchers must not fall into the trap of therapeutic misconception. Medically 
relevant information generated in the context of a research study should not be automatically 
transferred into the clinical realm. Participants should have the opportunity to decide 
whether they want their research findings to be a part of their medical records.
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